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This paper reports the results of a 2007 experiment testing if specific process simplification can 
foster increased take-up rates for savings products, particularly by low-to-moderate income 
(LMI) households.  Tax refund recipients at certain H&R Block tax preparation offices were 
given the option to purchase U.S. Savings Bonds with their tax refunds, augmenting the tax-site 
savings options offered by Block.  Those who received the savings bond offer were substantially 
more likely to purchase a savings product on-site than those who didn’t, even after controlling 
for client demographics. Much of this take-up was directed at intra-family gifting, or asset 
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Many policy proposals seek to encourage savings, some by providing financial 
incentives, others by supporting automatic contribution programs, and still others by simplifying 
the processes.  Field experiments have demonstrated how savings product take-up can be 
increased through these means (John Beshears et al., 2008 , James Choi et al., 2009, Esther Duflo 
et al., 2006 , Emmanuel Saez, 2009).   This paper reports on an experiment that sought to marry 
an existing distribution process (income-tax preparation) and a familiar savings product (U.S. 
Savings Bonds) to make it more convenient to purchase savings products.   
Over 5,000 clients at 31 H&R Block (Block) tax preparation offices in Massachusetts and 
Illinois comprised the control and treatment groups for the experiment.  Both groups had access 
to Block-branded savings products (“Easy Savings” and “Easy IRA”); but the 3,730 tax refund 
recipients in the treatment group also were given the opportunity to buy inflation-indexed (Series 
I) US Savings Bonds.  All of these on-site purchases were elected at the time of tax preparation 
and funded by filers’ tax refunds, requiring no explicit cash outlay.   
Offering the bond as an additional product choice could have depressed on-site savings 
product take up by confusing filers with too many choices (John T. Gourville and Dilip Soman, 
2005).  It could have cannibalized or crowded out sales of Block savings products, perhaps even 
leading filers to divide their funds equally among the choices (Shlomo Benartzi and Richard 
Thaler, 2001).   However, rather than suppress take up,  on-site purchase of any savings product 
at tax sites was 8.5 times higher in treatment offices than in control offices (7.05% vs. 0.74%), 
and after controlling for extensive demographic factors from survey and tax data, the bond offer 
led to a 5.5 percentage point increase in on-site take up.  Before the offer of savings products, 
participants were surveyed “Do you plan to save some of your federal refund?” without regard to 
when or how this might take place.  Overall, about a third of participants stated that they did not 2 
 
plan to save any of their refund.  Purchases of savings products by those with no plan to save at 
treatment sites were greater than by those who planned to save at control sites.  The savings 
bond offer did not lead to a cannibalization of tax-site sales for the Block savings products, nor a 
mechanical 1/n investment choice.   
 Of those who bought bonds, a substantial fraction (42%) reported having no existing 
financial assets at all, and 65% would be considered “asset poor” (i.e., financial assets less than 
$5000).  While the take up of many financial products, like mutual funds or stocks, is higher 
among families with higher incomes or wealth (Shlomo Benartzi and Richard Thaler, 2001, 
Brian Bucks et al., 2006) this was not the case for savings bonds in our experiment.  With respect 
to income and wealth, the bond offer seemed to appeal to individuals who were less well off.   
The experiment allowed refund recipients to buy bonds for themselves or for another co-
owner; and 69% bought bonds in co-ownership form.  Results from a related project show that 
these sales were primarily for children, suggesting potential for the old-fashioned concept of 
“gifting savings.” 
  While I may use the terms “saving” and “savers” as short-hand to represent the tax-site 
purchase of savings products, this paper (like others in this field), cannot establish if purchase of 
a savings product merely substituted for off-site savings activity or reflected a reduction in 
consumption (Peter Tufano and Daniel Schneider, 2009). However, purchases by people who 
claimed no intent to save any of their refund, and by those without any other savings, suggest 
that the offer may have fostered new savings.   
The remainder of this paper provides background and context for the experiment, then 
reports on three analyses: (a) the comparison of treatment and control groups with respect to 
their demographics and ex ante desire to save any of their refund; (b) the take up of savings 3 
 
products in treatment and control sites; and (c) the characteristics of savers, including savings 
goals, saver demographics, and the phenomenon of gifting savings.   
 
1. Background and Motivation for the Study 
Despite a recent increase in savings rates, the decades-long decline is notable (Andrea 
Ryan et al., 2010).
1  Furthermore, recent survey evidence suggests that almost half of American 
adults ages 18-65 cannot access $2000 within 30 days (whether from savings or other means) 
which leaves them vulnerable to even small economic shocks (Annamaria Lusardi et al., 2010).   
Prior work has established how changing financial incentives, product structure and so-
called choice architecture can affect savings and savings product take up.  For example, 
Individual Development Accounts (Michael Sherraden, 2008) offer match funding for low-
income asset builders. Tax time experiments with filers at H&R Block (Esther Duflo et al., 2006, 
Emmanuel Saez, 2009), and an analysis of company programs (James Choi et al., 2006) illustrate 
that match incentives increase both take-up rates and contributions in retirement plans. 
Changing other product terms can also have an effect on product attractiveness.   For 
example, commitment savings products that restrict withdrawals have been shown to increase 
savings. Ashraf et al’s (2006) study of commitment savings in the Phillipines examined a 
product where savers established goals (set to a date or an amount) and agreed to restrict access 
to their funds until they met their stated goals.  One year following the experiment, average 
savings of participants increased by 81% relative to those in the control group, which the 
researchers consider long-term net new savings. 
Yet other innovations address the sign-up process.   Thaler and Benartzi (2004) found 
                                                 
1 The personal savings rate dropped from roughly 11% in 1984 to less than 1% in 2008, but increased to 4% as of 
May 2010.   4 
 
that offering employees the opportunity to commit in advance to gradually increase their pension 
contributions over time through the SMarT program increased both take-up rates and overall 
contributions.  Choi et al (2006) support this idea, finding that savings interventions without this 
type of tiered structure are not successful. Madrian and Shea (2001) were among the first to 
show that changing the defaults can increase retirement program take up.     
Finally, innovations that reframe product descriptions and improve information delivery 
to make choices simpler increase take-up rates.  Saez (2009) shows that when tax filers are 
presented with the opportunity to open an IRA account with a choice between two equivalent-
value financial incentives—a 50% match on initial contributions versus a 33% cash-back credit 
on initial and ongoing contributions—the match option produced higher take up and contribution 
rates than the more complicated credit.  Choi, Laibson and Madrian (2009) tested the effect of 
making decision making easier, namely through their “Quick Enrollment” plan.  When 
employees were given the opportunity to easily enroll and select a plan with a pre-selected 
contribution rate and asset allocation (as opposed to making the more complicated set of 
decisions about whether or not to enroll and how to handle the allocation), participation 
increased three-fold.   
This study combines elements of these prior projects, facilitating the purchase of a 
traditional savings product with a commitment element in a simple fashion at a time when low- 
income households have money: tax time.  In 2007, the Federal government distributed $250 
billion in 2006 tax year refunds to Americans, of which nearly $115 billion went to families with 
incomes under $40,000.  Refund recipients with adjusted gross incomes (AGI) under $40,000 
received refunds of approximately $1,679.
2  Prior research suggests that families aspire to save at 
                                                 
2 http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/06in33ar.xls.   5 
 
least some of these monies (Sondra Beverly et al., 2006).  
The IRS has made it simpler for families to save by “paying themselves first” from their 
refunds by introducing Form 8888, which permits a refund recipient to send funds to up to three 
destinations.  There are, however, a few barriers.  First, without an existing account, this 
infrastructure cannot lead to savings; and account opening at tax sites remains spotty at best.  
Second, traditional depositories are wary of remote account opening as a result of “know your 
customer” (KYC) regulations, and generally are not inclined to open less-profitable small-
balance accounts.
3  Finally, mutual funds and other specialized investment products have 
substantial minimum investment requirements and must be sold through registered dealers 
(Daniel Schneider and Peter Tufano, 2007).
4  These barriers make it difficult to offer tax-time 
savings products.  Private preparers have shown limited support of tax-site savings (Peter Tufano 
and Daniel Schneider, 2004). 
Our experiment focuses on using bonds as a simple savings vehicle available to all as the 
“offer” at tax time.  Bonds can be bought by or for anyone with a social security number, 
including children and persons with poor credit or previous problems managing their finances.  
The product is well designed for individuals: bonds comes in small denominations, charge no 
fees, generally pay a competitive rate, guarantee no principal loss, provide good liquidity (after a 
year), and can be cashed in at more than 40,000 depositories around the country.  They are 
exempt from state and local taxes, and if used to pay for education, may have certain federal tax 
advantages as well.  Finally, Series I bonds are indexed to inflation, an attractive feature (See Zvi 
Bodie et al., 2009). One potential drawback (or advantage) of bonds is that they cannot be 
                                                 
3 Depositories may, in fact, simply refuse to open even savings accounts for individuals who have had past problems 
managing their checking and debit accounts.  See Campbell et al. 2007. 
4  For more information, see U.S. SEC http://www.sec.gov/investor/brokers.htm and FINRA 
http://www.finra.org/InvestorInformation/InvestorProtection/p005882 6 
 
redeemed for twelve months except in the case of natural disasters
5 and redemptions before five 
years are subject to the loss of three months of interest.  For savers seeking liquidity, these 
features are a negative; for those seeking a commitment savings vehicle, they are a plus.   
While a refund recipient could choose to go to a bank to buy a savings bond instead of 
buying one at the tax site, this two-step process is more cumbersome than a simpler one whereby 
a refund recipient can merely instruct the IRS to “keep some of my money.”  Indeed, a number 
of “institutional” theories explain low savings rates as a result of institutional impediments 
(Sondra Beverly and Michael Sherraden, 1999), and related research interventions show that 
process simplification can increase savings (James Choi et al., 2009).  This experiment seeks to 
find if making it simpler to purchase a savings bond at the tax site can materially increase the 
likelihood and level of savings product take up.  
 
2. Structure of the Experiment
6 
The research experiment was designed and executed by a team from H&R Block (Block) 
Corporation, Doorways to Dreams (D2D) Fund, and an academic research team.  Thirty-one 
Block tax-preparation offices were divided into treatment and control sites, selected to be 
comparable with respect to demographics of prior-year tax clients.  Participants in both groups 
had access to Block’s existing menu of savings products (“Easy Savings” and “Easy IRA”).  
However, only the treatment group had the additional opportunity to purchase US Savings 
Bonds.   
                                                 
5 http://www.savingsbonds.gov/indiv/research/indepth/ebonds/res_e_bonds_eeredeem_disaster.htm (last visited on 
9/3/08) 
6 Portions of the section on related to experimental design and Block-site operations are drawn from Maynard 2008 
with permission. 7 
 
Selection of Treatment and Control Offices.  The 31 Block tax-preparation offices were 
located in two districts — Boston, MA (20 offices) and Schaumberg, IL (11 offices).
7 Twenty-
seven offices were designated as “treatment” (16 in Boston, 11 in Schaumberg) and four were 
designated as “control” (all in Boston).  To select treatment and control offices, we analyzed the 
prior tax season’s (2006 or “TS06”) client data to identify offices that were comparable with 
respect to weighted average adjusted gross income (AGI), refunds, and take up of other Block 
savings products which are described below.  The average ex ante figures for the control and 




















Control Offices  $ 38,534  $ 2,989  25%  0.009 %  0.25 % 
Treatment Offices  $ 35,732  $ 3,300  27%  0.010 %  0.23 % 
(Maynard 2008) 
 
While the selection of treatment and control offices sought to eliminate differences in the 
populations, we also collected client-level data to control for other variation in the two samples. 
Table 1 shows the characteristics of filers in the treatment and control offices.  The 
treatment group was comprised of 3,730 Block clients who each completed a survey and 
received the bond offer. The control group was comprised of 1,484 Block clients who were 
administered the survey only. While treatment and control populations are not dissimilar with 
respect to AGI or age, they do differ markedly on other characteristics, including even refund 
amount, which was an ex ante selection criterion.  The control group members inadvertently 
were more likely to be male single filers, to have pension plans, to be homeowners, and to have 
                                                 
7 All eleven of the Schaumberg offices participated in the TS06 pre-experiment.   8 
 
larger refund amounts.  They also were more likely to answer that they planned to save some of 
their refund, as discussed below.  Had we been able to randomize the offer, some or all of these 
differences might have become insignificant.  Fortunately, we have extensive survey and tax 
information which we use to isolate treatment effects by controlling for these differences in 
multivariate analyses. 
Tax Professional Training, Marketing Materials, and Incentives.  Over 400 H&R Block 
tax professionals participated in the experiment during the fourteen-week tax season from 
January through mid-April 2007.  Prior work shows that tax professionals vary in their support of 
these types of experiments (Esther Duflo, William Gale, Jeffrey Liebman, Peter Orszag and 
Emmanuel Saez, 2006 ).  While one cannot control for variation in the personality and sales 
approaches of tax professionals, control and treatment office tax professionals were trained 
together, used the same tax prep software providing standardized scripts, received the same 
incentives, and collected tax and survey data using the same tools.   
Each tax professional underwent a 90-minute training session covering the mechanics 
and logic of the experiment, details of US Savings Bonds, the Tax Preparation Software (TPS) 
system processes, research protocols, and the highlights of the bond fulfillment process.  The 
marketing materials in the treatment offices included small posters (i.e., privacy panels), table 
tents, pamphlets, and tax professional summary sheets with key aspects of the products and 
process.  Marketing materials used the messages about the ease of purchasing a bond (“US 
Savings Bonds are easy to buy.”); the immediacy (“We can help you buy them today.”); the 
inflation-indexed rates (at the time 4.52%; lower than the rates on prevailing Block products); 
and the affordability (You can save “for as little as $50.”)  Tax professionals received no 9 
 
incremental compensation for selling either bonds or Block products, but did receive nominal 
compensation for the completion of surveys.  
Selection of Study Participants:  Block clients with federal tax refunds of $500 or more 
were eligible to participate in the research study, which meant that they would be surveyed and, 
if in a treatment office, would receive an offer to purchase US Savings Bonds.  A total of 40,978 
clients were qualified:  34,348 of whom were in the treatment offices (6,324 in Schaumberg and 
28,024 in Boston) and 6,630 in the control offices (all in Boston).  Of qualified clients in the 
treatment offices, 11% (3,730/34,348) chose to complete the survey, as did 22% (1,484/6,630) of 
qualified clients in the control offices. While clients could buy as little as $50 in savings bonds, 
the $500 refund level to participate in the experiment reflected operational considerations in 
Block offices, in particular the need to have enough funds to pay for the tax preparation process 
out of the refund and fund the conduit account through which the savings bonds would be 
purchased (discussed below).  
Process flow.   Block’s tax professionals collect information from the filer, provide 
advice, prepare the necessary forms, and present options for disbursing refunds and saving.  This 
process is standardized by an elaborate computer program, Block’s Tax Preparation Software 
(TPS), which prompts the tax professional through a structured interview process.  This 
interview is designed to collect background information that does not appear on the tax forms 
(e.g., “Are you a homeowner?”) as well as information that would appear on the 1040 form (e.g., 
filing status).     
After the tax professional calculated the tax owed or amount to be refunded, TPS would 
automatically alert him/her as to whether or not the client was eligible to participate in the 
research.  If so, a screen would prompt the tax professional to ask clients if they would be willing 10 
 
to respond to a brief survey.  (See survey questions in Appendix.)  Client affirmation served as 
consent for participation in the study. A total of 5,214 clients completed the survey, 3,755 (2,271 
treatment and 1,484 control) from Boston and 1,459 (treatment) from Schaumberg.
8  The first 
question asked customers if they planned to save any of their federal refund (i.e., determined 
“refund savings intent”). It should be noted, however, that this question did not distinguish 
between saving on-site (i.e., purchasing Block products or savings bonds) and saving off-site 
(e.g., putting money into another product or institution). 
Tax professionals working in treatment offices then would see an “offer screen” 
prompting them to offer savings bonds to the client and to explain the bond purchase process, 
including the fact that Block would serve as the purchasing agent for the client, and the 
requirement that the client temporarily open a conduit H&R Block Easy Savings to fund the 
bond purchase.  Clients could purchase bonds using as little as $50.  They also could purchase 
bonds for themselves or for up to four additional co-owners. 
If a client chose to purchase a bond, the tax professional had to remember first to open 
the conduit Easy Savings account.  Unfortunately, this proved to be an operational stumbling 
block in that tax professionals sometimes failed to complete this step in the process.  Some 
clients who expressed their intent to purchase bonds did not end up actually purchasing or 
receiving them, but rather received their full refund amount in whatever other form they had 
designated.  As a result, there were more clients who directed the tax professional to purchase 
bonds than who actually purchased them.  (To account for this in the analysis, I used the client 
instructions as the indicator of purchase intent, but also carried out robustness checks using only 
                                                 
8 No identifying information (e.g., names, social security numbers, addresses) was made available to the researchers.  
It was not required that a client complete a research survey in order to purchase a US Savings Bond.  Ten clients 
purchased US Savings Bonds but opted out of participating in this research study.  Their data are not included in this 
analysis.     11 
 
fully-executed purchases.  None of the multivariate results change materially using the executed 
purchase data, which is consistent with operational errors being fairly random.)  
The minimum Easy Savings purchase was $300, but clients could buy as little as $50 in 
bonds.   Bond buyers were neither required, nor encouraged, to retain  funds in the conduit Easy 
Savings account. Rather, they were explicitly given choices for how they could receive the 
balance of the account that was not used to buy savings bonds. Clients buying less than $300 in 
bonds were given the choice to (1) direct deposit the balance into another bank account; (2) 
receive the balance as a paper check or (3) keep the monies in the Easy Savings account.   
The Savings Product Options.  The key differences between the Easy Savings, Easy IRA 
and U.S. Savings Bond products are listed below.
9   
   Easy IRA 
(Roth or Traditional)  Easy Savings  Series I U.S. 
Savings Bond 
Initial Yield   5.00%  5.00%  4.52% 
Fees  Yes  Yes  No 
Minimum to open  $300  $300  $50 
Rate variability 
Adjusts with market 
conditions; essentially a 
money market fund 
Adjusts with market 
conditions; 
essentially a money 
market fund 
Adjusts bi-annually, as a 
function of the CPI.  
Owner earns roughly 
1.4% plus the annualized 
inflation rate 
Minimum holding 




Penalties if redeemed 
before age 59 ½; taxes on 
earnings if redeemed within 
first 5 years (generally)
None 
3 months interest 
(redemptions within 5 
years of purchase) 
Maturity  None  None  Stops earning interest 
after 30 years  
ChexSystems 
review  No  No  No 
May buy as a gift  No   No  Yes, as co-owner 
                                                 
9 This chart was not part of the marketing materials presented by tax professionals.   12 
 
Government 
backing  FDIC insured   FDIC insured  Full faith and credit of 
US Government 
Are contributions 
tax advantaged?  
Yes (Traditional, up to IRS 
annual maximum); No 
(Roth)  
No  No 
Are earnings 
taxable? 




Interest exempt from 
state and local tax and in 
some cases, federal tax 
(when used for 
education) 
 
The savings bond differs from the Block products on a number of dimensions, some 
favorably and others unfavorably.  Its small denominations, lack of fees, inflation indexing, 
explicit government backing, and ability to be gifted are plusses.  However, the lower up-front 
yield, required holding period, and complicated rate setting rules (inflation plus a fixed rate) 
might reduce its attractiveness. From a research perspective, adding a product with many 
different features makes it difficult to identify which feature might be most important; but from a 
policy perspective, adding an existing product tests the impact of a feasible policy change. 
Tax Professional Attitudes.  We did not select offices on the basis of the interest levels of 
tax professionals.  We intended the research protocol to be a seamless add-on to the existing tax-
preparation process.  However, in mid-season focus groups, tax professionals indicated that they 
saw it as an additional burden, for reasons ranging from the time it took to sell the bonds to 
technological glitches (e.g., the survey software occasionally crashed the system.)  They believed 
that the way the program was implemented decreased tax-professionals’ interest in offering the 
bonds and hence likely reduced customer take-up rates for the bonds themselves.  Representative 
quotes from the focus groups indicate their concerns.  
  “The way we were selling the bonds tended to restrict the amount of sales we got” 
  “It was a shame that they were limited to only people getting a refund over $500 because 
I think some of the other people would have bought it. Or if they could have bought it 
even though they weren’t getting a refund.” 13 
 
  “Some people thought that the bond questions on the survey were kind of intrusive…[and 
said] I don’t want to do this anymore when they got to that point.” 
  “I would have more clients [buying bonds].  They told me, “I wish I had would have 
known about this before I came in.”…They’re not impulse buyers. 
 
3.  Refund Savings Intent   
  The first survey question, “Do you plan to save any of your refund?” was asked to all 
participants before explaining or proposing any savings products.  It was designed to measure 
refund savings intent in that it refers to savings explicitly related to the tax refund.  However it 
deliberately did not refer to tax-site product purchases, hence, someone planning to use some of 
their refund to buy a CD or stocks would have answered affirmatively. 
Ideally, refund savings intent would have been equal between control and treatment 
populations.  It was not: 76% of the control group and 63% of the treatment group expressed ex 
ante refund savings intent.  On its face, this difference could lead us to underestimate the effect 
of the bond offer.
10  Multivariate analyses can control for refund savings intent as well as the 
differences in observable characteristics. 
The survey and tax data can help describe differences between those who did and did not 
plan to save some of their refunds.  If mental accounting is pervasive, the marginal propensity to 
consume or save from one income source (e.g., refunds) may be different from another (e.g., 
salary or windfalls) (James Choi et al., 2008, Richard Thaler, 1985, 1999, 1990).   In general, 
prior work illustrates that refund recipients often aspire to save some of their refunds in the sense 
of putting them aside for future consumption. (Michael S. Barr and Jane K. Dokko, 2006, Lisa 
Barrow and Leslie M. McGranahan, 2000, Barbara Robles, 2005, Jennifer Romich and Thomas 
Weisner, 2000, Daniel Schneider and Peter Tufano, 2006, Timothy Smeeding et al., 2000). 
                                                 
10 However, pension coverage was 18% higher in the treatment group than the control group, suggesting that 
members of the treatment group could have had other, more, or different opportunities to save off site, and the lower 
refund savings intent reflected only their interest in saving funds directly out of the refund. 14 
 
Browning and Lusardi’s (1996) survey of savings theory and empirical results summarizes the 
extant literature on savings.  I examined whether these broad patterns regarding saving helped to 
predict the narrower concept of refund savings intent.  If the latter is positively correlated with 
the former phenomenon, we expect to find a relationship between refund savings intent and: 
  Age (and age squared to capture nonlinearities) 
  Marital status (as picked up by filing status) and number of dependents 
  Income (as measured by adjusted gross income) 
  Disruptions to income through unemployment 
  Financial wealth (measured by financial assets) 
  Owning real assets (e.g., being a home owner) 
  Owning stocks or mutual funds (as proxied by dividend income) 
  Having a pension plan 
 
In addition, we included a few other variables that could influence one's intent or ability  
 
to save some of their refund: 
 
  Refund amount, reasoning that people receiving larger refunds may be more 
interested in saving some of the refund 
  Unbanked, measured by whether the person has a checking or savings account, to 
test if lack of connection to the traditional financial system is related to desire to 
save. 
  Student indicators, perhaps capturing short-run inability to save due to life cycle 
considerations. 
 
Table 2 examines refund savings intent as a function of demographic factors as well as the 
treatment/control office variable.   
While refund savings intent is much more limited than savings overall, its patterns 
reflected many of the traits from Browning and Lusardi’s predictions and stylized facts from 
extant empirical work.  In particular, refund savings intent was lower among filers with lower 
incomes and no current savings, as well as those who are unbanked.  Certain demographic 
characteristics mattered, too.  Younger persons, single men, joint filers, and those with more 
dependents had lower levels of refund savings intent.  Finally, refund savings intent also was 
lower among filers receiving smaller refunds.  As mentioned above, even after controlling for 15 
 
these demographic variables, participants in treatment offices expressed a 12 percentage point 
lower interest in saving some of their refund than did participants in control offices.  After 
controlling for the other demographics, this difference should lead to lower product take up in 
the treatment offices than in the control offices, and bias against finding a result.  
 
4.  Tax-site Savings:  Does Savings Product Purchase Increase When Offering Bonds? 
The experiment sought to understand whether facilitating the purchase of a savings bond 
could make a material change in the amount of money tax filers directed from their refunds into 
savings products.  The results suggest that on-site savings product  take up was enhanced through 
the experiment.  After controlling for demographics and refund savings intent, individuals who 
had the opportunity to purchase savings bonds with their refunds (i.e., treatment group 
participants) were considerably more likely to purchase any savings product on-site than those 
who didn’t have the opportunity to buy savings bonds (i.e., control group participants).   
The incidence of tax-site take up. Table 3 provides descriptive statistics on realized on-
site savings product take–up rates by filers at control and treatment offices.  Realized tax-site 
savings includes the tax-time savings available on-site:  US Savings Bond, Easy IRA, or Easy 
Savings instruments (but excluding pass-through usage of the latter to fund the bond purchase).  
The data illustrate average deposits into savings products purchased for the following categories:  
any product (bonds and/or Block products), bonds only, Block products only, and a combination 
of bonds and Block products.   
The incidence and level of savings product take up was markedly higher in treatment 
offices.  The fraction of refund recipients who chose to purchase tax-site savings products was 
8.5 times higher in treatment offices than in control offices (7.05% vs. 0.74%).  There is no 16 
 
evidence of 1/n allocations across products, as only 23% of savers bought both Block products 
and bonds.   
The offer of bonds, and their purchase, led to a higher take up of Block products, so 
apparently did not “crowd out” Block purchases.  Table 3 reports that Block product take up was 
2.76% in treatment offices versus 0.76% in control offices.  Some of this increase was likely due 
to monies left in Easy Savings accounts after bond purchases.  However, even among those who 
did not buy savings bonds—and hence were not subject to inadvertent take up of the conduit 
account—take up of Block products was slightly higher in treatment offices than in control 
offices (1.15% vs. 0.76%).  While this difference is neither economically nor statistically 
striking, it fails to show any crowd-out effect.   
To isolate the impact of the bond offer on take up, I control for the demographics of 
refund recipients.  Table 4, column a1, reports a dprobit analysis of realized tax-site take up as a 
function of the same variables used in Table 3 plus the following two variables: (a) refund 
savings intent (included with the thought that ex ante refund savings intent relates to ex post tax-
site savings); and (b) use of tax refund lending products (included with the idea that consumers 
who are cash constrained and therefore use a tax refund lending product may be less likely to 
save).  Column a2 repeats this analysis without the refund savings intent coefficient. 
After controlling for the factors in Table 4, the offer of bonds led to a 5.5 percentage 
point increase in the likelihood of take up in treatment sites over control sites. Thus, the 6.3 
percentage point difference in take up in Table 3 is not attributable to observable differences 
between treatment and control groups with respect to variables including income, wealth, age, 
and filing status, nor to the unobservable trait of refund savings intent.  After controlling for all 
of these factors, tax-site take up was substantially higher in treatment sites. 17 
 
This is not to say the various demographic factors do not explain the incidence of 
purchasing savings products.  In both specifications, the likelihood of take up was positively 
related to refund amount and number of dependents, while negatively related to AGI.  For each 
additional $1000 in refund amount, the likelihood of take up increased by 0.4-0.6%.  For each 
dependent, the likelihood increased by 1.1%.  Both of these are significant at the 1% level.   
The relationship with AGI, while weaker, runs counter to the overall pattern that the 
wealthier save more.  For each $1000 increase in AGI, the likelihood of take up declined by 
0.02%.
11  While this coefficient was small yet significant, it is critical to compare it to the same 
coefficient on refund savings intent in Table 2.  Refund savings intent was strongly positively 
related to AGI, consistent with substantial evidence that more well-to-do are more likely to own 
financial assets or have other opportunities to save.  However, the actual decision to purchase 
savings products at a tax site was weakly negatively related to AGI.  Similarly, while refund 
savings intent was lower for filers with more dependents, realized take up was higher for those 
with more dependents.  All of these results suggest that this particular tax-site savings 
intervention altered savings purchase patterns, encouraging on-site saving purchases among 
those who were otherwise less inclined to save any of their refund. 
Introducing the tax refund lending variable had no significant effect on take up.  People 
who took out high-cost refund loans were no less likely to purchase a savings product than 
others.  Whether the use of these products indicates short-term credit constraints, severe 
impatience, or present-mindedness, it apparently was not a barrier to product take up.   
The likelihood of a refund client purchasing some tax-site savings product was related to 
refund savings intent, albeit at relatively low levels.  The ex ante intent to save some of the 
                                                 
11 Similarly, while filers with no assets had substantially lower savings intent (as shown in Table 2), they were no 
less likely to actually save than those filers with the greatest financial assets. 18 
 
refund led to a 3.6% increase in the likelihood of take up. This fits with recent research on the 
positive effect of advance notice on take-up rates of IRAs (Emmanuel Saez, 2009) as well as 
comments by tax professionals that take up could have been heightened if filers had been made 
aware of the savings options beforehand.   
Since including the refund savings intent variable may capture planned savings decisions 
related to observable differences within our sample, column a2 reports the results excluding this 
variable.  This change in the specification has very little effect on the results, and changes only 
one variable in a significant way.  When the refund savings intent variable was removed from the 
analysis, those with no current savings were 2.2% more likely to take up a savings product than 
were those with the most financial assets. 
Beyond the differences discussed above, there were differences in take-up between the 
Illinois (treatment only) and Massachusetts (treatment and control) sites.  Comparing the two 
treatment groups, take-up of any savings product was considerably higher in Illinois (8.6%) than 
in Boston (6.0%).
12   I re-estimated the models in Table 4 to control for this difference in a 
multivariate setting.  If one adds a Boston fixed effect to the specification in A1, the coefficient 
on “Offered Savings Bonds” drops from 5.50% to 4.77%, but maintains the same level of 
significance as shown in Table 4 and the Boston fixed effect has a coefficient of -2.72% with a 
p-value of .000.  If one adds an interaction term, Boston*Offer fixed effect, the Offer coefficient 
rises to 6.16% and this new interaction term has a value of -2.24%.  The other coefficients 
change values slightly, but there are no material changes in sign, size or significance of other 
predictors of tax-site product take up.  While these geographic differences don’t change the 
                                                 
12 While there were no Schaumberg control sites, the Boston control take-up of less than 1%  was consistent with 




overall picture, they do suggest that regional differences can be meaningful for any small scale, 
non-national study.  In this instance, one cannot rule out that the two-week TS06 feasibility test 
in Schaumberg might have increased take up in those locations. 
  The level of tax-site product purchases. Table 3 also provides descriptive statistics on 
the level of product purchases in treatment and control offices.  This information is presented 
three ways: in dollars, as a percentage of AGI, and as a percentage of the refund amount. The 
information is provided on a per capita basis for all filers (top set of results), for all savers 
(second set of results), and by product purchased (third and fourth sets of results).       
In brief, the per capita results for all filers show that not only did more people in the 
treatment offices choose to use some portion of their refund to purchase a savings product, but 
also average amounts were higher ($28.21 versus $12.95 per filer).   However, while there were 
more product purchasers in the treatment offices, they tended to buy less on a per-saver basis 
than those in the control offices.
13  In terms of the amounts deposited into the savings products, 
those made by the treatment group totaled less than a quarter of the amount deposited by those in 
the control offices, and represent a smaller fraction of both their AGI and refund amount.  In 
simple terms, in control offices a few people purchased products but deposited a lot; in treatment 
offices many more people bought savings products, but on average, deposited much less.    
  Table 4, columns b1-b3 show Tobit analyses of the savings amount in dollars (column 
b1), as a fraction of AGI (b2) and as a fraction of refund amount (b3).   The level of savings 
product purchases was higher in treatment offices, for individuals with greater intent to save, for 
filers receiving larger refunds, and for those with more dependents.  Savings product purchase 
                                                 
13 The control office numbers are considerably inflated by a single person who invested $10,000 in an Easy IRA. 
Without this one observation, the control site savings levels—while still higher than the treatment savings levels—
would have been cut by half, e.g., the average savings would have been $923. 
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levels were lower for filers with higher adjusted gross incomes.  Compared with filers with 
substantial financial assets (over $40,000), amounts were lower for filers with no pre-treatment 
savings, but also for filers with other levels of saving.   
 
5.  Who are these bond buyers?  Why purchase bonds?  Is this likely “savings”? 
Using detailed survey and tax data, I profile the savers, determining the similarities and 
differences between bond buyers and buyers of Block products.  I also differentiate them on the 
basis of their primary savings goals.      
Table 5 provides two types of analyses of the characteristics of bond buyers and Block-
product buyers.  Columns a1 and a2 provide dprobit analyses of buyers of bonds (a1) and Block 
products (a2) as compared with those filers who did not buy these products.
14  Columns b1-b3 
provide the results of a multinomial logit analysis of four filer types: those who only bought 
bonds (b1), those who bought bonds and Block products (b2), and those who bought only Block 
products (b3), all of which are expressed relative to those who made no tax-site product 
purchases (the base case).   
For both analyses, purchasing any of the savings products is related to refund savings 
intent and refund amounts, although the purchase of bonds is substantially more sensitive to 
refund amount than the purchase of Block products.  For example, in the dprobit analyses, refund 
savings intent is related to a 5.4% increased likelihood of buying bonds but only a 2.1% increase 
in the likelihood of buying a Block product.   
There are some material differences between the buyers of the different products.  Filers 
with more dependents were more likely to be bond buyers and not Block product purchasers. 
                                                 
14 The samples in these two columns include all study participants in treatment sites.  In unreported results, these 
dprobit results were rerun for bond buyers vs. non-savers and Block product buyers vs. non-savers.  The results are 
virtually identical for the former sample, but for the latter, three variables (age squared, having a pension plan, and 
the size of the refund) become insignificant when Block buyers are compared against only non-savers.   21 
 
Consistent with this finding, bond-buyers’ savings goals are more family-centered.  I include a 
variable that indicates the filer’s primary reason for saving or investing in general (although not 
the reason for this transaction in particular.)  Family–centered goals (i.e., respondents indicated 
that education and/or children/family was their most important reason for saving) are coded as 
one, with the other goals (e.g., retirement, housing, cars, emergencies) coded as zero. Selecting a 
family-centered primary savings goal was positively associated with bond purchases, but 
negatively related to purchases of only Block products.  In short, bond buyers have more 
dependents and are saving for their families—one of the original intents of the US Savings Bond 
program.   
Perhaps it is not surprising that the offer of a traditional family-oriented product (bonds) 
led to take-up among family-focused savers; however, there are relatively few alternatives of this 
sort marketed to low-income families.  For example, tax-advantaged 529 plans are primarily 
taken up by higher income households (Margaret Clancy et al., 2004, Michael Sherraden, 2009). 
To test if bond sales were driven by those previously aware of or experienced with bonds, 
we included a survey question to gauge filers’ awareness of bonds (“Have you ever heard about 
US Savings Bonds before today?”) and their experience as bond purchaser (“Have you ever 
bought US Savings Bonds before today?”).  Both of these questions were asked prior to the 
actual offer of bonds.  Both awareness of and experience with bonds was extraordinarily high in 
the sample, with 89.0% of filers having known of and 39.2% having bought bonds in the past.
15 
While sales of Block products were unrelated to prior bond activity, bond sales were 2.4% 
                                                 
15  These percentages were identical between control and treatment groups. While current holdings of savings bonds 
are lower than this level, it captures the experience of ever buying bonds, not currently owning them.  While only 
14.9% of people in the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances currently hold bonds, in 1977, this figure was 31%.  
Furthermore, many people purchase bonds for others as gifts, and the question refers to the purchase of bonds not 
their ownership.  22 
 
higher among people who said they had previously not heard about bonds.  One interpretation of 
these results is that bonds are more marketable to “new” customers than to existing customers.
16   
While take-up rates for virtually all financial products are positively related to income 
and wealth., bonds sold at tax time seem to appeal broadly.  There is no systematic relationship 
between bond take up and financial assets, with the coefficients of all but one of the asset ranges 
indistinguishable from the take up of filers with the highest level of financial assets (>$40,000).  
In contrast, Block product sales are lower for filers with financial assets from $5000 to 
$40,000.
17   
    It is important to consider whether the bond and Block product purchases could be 
characterized as “new” savings: Did the money deposited into these products represent (net) 
savings that would not have been done otherwise?  I cannot answer this question directly.  I was 
unable to track the long-run consumption of bond buyers and the relatively small size of bond 
purchases in comparison to annual consumption would make it unlikely to find statistically 
reliable results.  However, there is suggestive evidence that bond purchases may have resulted in 
savings in the formal sense.  A material fraction of bond buyers had few or no financial assets 
before purchasing bonds. Slightly over 42% of bond buyers reported having no prior financial 
assets and 65% could be considered “asset poor” (e.g., having financial assets of less than 
$5000.)
18      
                                                 
16 Bonds are sometimes thought of as “old fashioned.” Therefore, some might suspect that older persons would be 
more likely to purchase bonds.  The data do not bear out this hypothesis, either in the dprobit or mlogit analyses.  
We found no relationship between age or age-squared and purchase of bonds in either analysis.  Older filers are 
more likely to buy Block products, but this relationship flattens with a negative age-squared coefficient.  This result 
is more pronounced for filers buying both Block products and bonds.  
17 It is not clear why this group would have lower take up than those with more than $40,000 in financial assets.  We 
also find that refund recipients with pensions are less likely to buy Block products, perhaps because their pensions 
made them less interested in IRA products. 
18 As part of the survey, filers were asked how much money they thought they needed to have saved for 
emergencies. While the responses were spotty and not used in the formal analysis, the $5700 average is the same 
rough order of magnitude as the $5000 figure which is sometimes used as a metric of asset poverty. 23 
 
It is possible that the bond sale merely substituted for off-site savings activity.  Even so, 
if someone purchased a bond, but stated, ex ante, that she had no intent to save any of her refund, 
we have reason to suspect that the intervention led to higher levels of saving than we might 
otherwise have observed.  Figure 1 shows the take-up rates at the treatment sites when the data 
are double sorted by reported savings and refund savings intent.  Refund recipients with the 
lowest levels of asset holdings but who reported intent to save showed the highest take-up rates, 
between 9.5 and 14.3%.  This could reflect enhanced interest or opportunity due to the 
experiment.  Perhaps the most striking result is that the take up of bonds by those who hadn’t 
planned to save any of their refunds (2.4%) in treatment offices was 2.3 times higher than the 
take-up rate of all savings products by those who did (0.7%) in control offices. We must interpret 
this with caution, however, as we are unable to determine whether recipients allocated a portion 
or all of their refund to another savings vehicle off-site. 
 
6.  Why and for whom are they buying savings products? 
Participants were asked to identify their primary savings goal (for any saving, not limited 
to the tax-site opportunities) by responding to the following question (and corresponding answer 
choices as seen in Figure 2):  “What is your (and your spouse's) most important reason for 
saving and investing?”  Figure 2 shows the distribution of responses both for those who bought 
bonds and those who declined the offer.  Retirement savings was the top choice for 40% of all 
study participants.  Family-centered goals were consistently ranked the second and third choices 
for bond buyers as compared to only 20.4% for non-bond buyers.
19  Non-bond buyers reported 
                                                 
19 Many of the savings goals have some family component (e.g., housing, everyday household expenses), but these 
two are the most obvious of the categories.   Education is likely for a child, as the average age of the study 
participants is 38. 24 
 
that housing (e.g., purchasing a home, making home improvements or making housing 
payments) was the second-most important goal.   
Under the structure of the experiment, individuals could purchase bonds for as many as 
four other persons, to a maximum of four sets of “co-owners,” in effect sharing ownership with 
someone else.
20 Where we see co-ownership, in essence the filer is “gifting savings” to another 
person.  The majority (69%) of all bond buyers in the sample bought at least one bond in co-
ownership form, with this revealed preference suggesting that the gifting feature was important 
to bond buyers
21  In this study, we cannot identify the relationship of the bond purchaser to the 
co-owner, but results from a companion project carried out at VITA sites show that most of them 
were for children or grandchildren.
22  While the economics literature has focused on the bequest 
motive as one reason for saving (Martin Browning and Annamaria Lusardi, 1996), this savings 
gift is not a traditional deathbed bequest, but rather an intra-family savings gift.   
I estimated a multivariate dprobit analysis of gifting among bond buyers, as a function of 
the demographics used in earlier tables.  (Table available from author.) Conditional on buying 
any bonds, the likelihood of buying a bond for someone else was positively related to refund 
amount, number of dependents, filing status and having a family-centered savings goal. For 
example, the likelihood of gifting was about 34 percentage points higher among married filing 
jointly than among single filers.  Relative to people with savings above $40,000, those with 
savings between $1 and $20,000 were about 20 to 25 percentage points more likely to gift.  
                                                 
20 Due to the manner in which the bonds were sold, the primary refund recipient was required to be a co-owner 
along with their designee.  Co-ownership of the Block products was not possible. 
21 In the brief TS06 pre-experiment, due to operational limitations, refund recipients did not have the opportunity to 
buy bonds in co-ownership form.  Compared with the 5.9% bond take up in this experiment, the TS06 bond take-up 
rate was only 2.9% (Tufano, 2007).  While this difference might be attributable to a number of factors, it is 
consistent with the hypothesis that gifting is an important feature of savings bonds. 
22 In the VITA survey, a total of 74% of bond purchasers responded that their co-owners were children/stepchildren 
or grandchildren/stepgrandchildren. (Flacke et al 2008). 25 
 
Those with family-centered savings goals were 20 to 25 percentage points more likely to gift.  
Other variables, such as refund savings intent, age, etc. were not related to co-ownership. 
We cannot rule out that these bond-givers would have bought bonds, or some other 
savings product, for others off-site. However, we can rule out that all of the increase in take up is 
attributable only to gift-giving.  Excluding those who bought co-registered bonds, single-
registered bonds had a take up of 1.8%, which is still more than twice that at control offices.  
Finally, buyers (and non-buyers) were asked to identify the most appealing feature of 
bonds.
23  I carried out a dprobit analysis (table available from author) of the likelihood of buying 
a bond at a treatment site as a function of the filers’ judgment of the most attractive features of 
bonds.  The probability of buying a bond increased substantially if the filer judged the bond’s 
primary appealing feature to be its competitive interest rate (17.7%), low $50 minimum savings 
entry point (15.7%), lack of fees (12.2%), and its penalties for early withdrawal (11.3%).  The 
first three of these are understandable, but the fourth indicates that people seem to value the 
commitment nature of the product, echoing the results of other studies on commitment savings 
vehicles (Nava Ashraf, Dean Karlan and Welsey Yin, 2006).   
  
                                                 
23 The combined results are reported in the Appendix.  26 
 
7.  Discussion and implications 
The inadequate level of household savings, especially among the less well-to-do, is an 
increasingly critical problem in America, requiring many different interventions.  Some solutions 
will involve costly financial incentives, while others leverage psychology to set up defaults so 
that saving can hardly be avoided (Peter Tufano and Daniel Schneider, 2009).   Our experiment 
complements these innovations and addresses the institutional impediments to saving by making 
it easy and painless for tax-refund recipients to save. 
Offering tax filers the option to easily buy US Savings Bonds materially increased the 
incidence of savings product take up from about 1% to 7%; and almost none of this difference 
can be attributed to demographic characteristics of the study participants.  We see purchase of 
savings products by those who don’t save—or who have little savings.  We see family-centered 
take up by families with dependents and in the form of co-ownership.  Rather than exhibiting 
overchoice indecision or 1/n biases, filers bought bonds—and Block products too.  While the 
intervention at Block sites was carried out by paid tax professionals, companion studies at 
volunteer income-tax sites show similar, if not higher, levels of take up, even among populations 
with substantially lower incomes and wealth (Tim Flacke, Preeti Mehta and Jeff Zinsmeyer, 
2008).   
Why did the Block intervention increase tax-site take up for people who did not typically 
save?  After all, Block already had been offering savings products at the tax site, and US Savings 
Bonds already were available at banks and credit unions.  One answer is that this intervention 
demonstrated the power of offering the appropriate product at the right time—when people have 
money that has not yet been spent.  It also seems that bonds appealed to a particular 
demographic: people with dependents and family-centered savings goals, and those who wished 27 
 
to give savings to others through co-ownership.  Because bonds differed from the Block product 
suite on many dimensions, the experimental design cannot isolate a single reason for the 
increased take up.  However, the bonds’ competitive rates, low entry point, and lack of fees were 
attractive to buyers.    
  As a post-script, on September 5, 2009, President Obama announced that all Americans 
would be able to direct a portion of their refunds to the purchase of savings bonds using IRS 
Form 8888 starting in January 2010.  (In the first year, the program would not permit co-
ownership and gifting, but this feature would be added in the following tax year.)  While this 
universal roll-out of the program will preclude some types of control and treatment experiments, 
it will provide opportunities to observe whether the small sample results will be reproduced at 
scale.  It offers all Americans the opportunity to purchase a savings product—and hopefully to 
save—with a simple election on their tax form. 
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Number of filers 1,484 3,730 na
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS
Adjusted Gross Income $42,062 $40,913 0.248
Age (mean) 38 38 0.945
Gender (if not joint filer)
   Female 45% 44% 0.393
   Male 41% 33% 0.000
Full-time student 5% 6% 0.472


















Does not have a checking nor a savings account 12% 15% 0.007
Has a pension plan 34% 52% 0.000
Awareness and experience with Savings Bonds before today
Heard of them  89% 89% 0.706
Bought them 39% 40% 0.868








Bought a refund lending product (IMAL, IRAL or RAL) 17% 18% 0.137
Mean refund amount $528 $631 0.000





































































































Number 160 60 43
Percent of all 4.29% 1.61% 1.15%
Average Savings $249.53 $678.30 $572.72
  as % of AGI 1.28% 2.14% 1.64%







A1 A2 B1 B2 B3





Plans to save part of the refund 0.036*** 825.200*** 0.031*** 0.483***
(0.005) (120.000) (0.004) (0.071)
Has neither a checking nor a savings account ‐0.008 ‐0.011 ‐143.800 ‐0.006 ‐0.104
(0.006) (0.006) (143.000) (0.005) (0.085)
Tax Filing Status (omitted category is single)
   Married filing joint 0.003 0.002 118.900 0.002 0.082
(0.008) (0.009) (151.000) (0.005) (0.089)
   Married filing separately ‐0.005 ‐0.005 ‐98.850 ‐0.005 ‐0.052
(0.020) (0.022) (472.000) (0.017) (0.280)
   Head of household 0.005 0.003 115.900 0.002 0.070
(0.007) (0.008) (133.000) (0.005) (0.079)
   Qualifying widow(er) 0.134 0.089 1170.000 0.036 0.617
(0.180) (0.140) (944.000) (0.034) (0.570)
Age 0.0002 ‐0.00002 ‐6.224 ‐0.00002 ‐0.011
(0.001) (0.001) (22.600) (0.001) (0.013)
Age squared 0.000001 0.000003 0.149 0.000003 0.0002
(0.00001) (0.00002) (0.260) (0.00001) (0.0002)
Gender (if not joint filer; omitted category is male)
   Female 0.001 0.003 6.570 ‐0.0002 0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (111.000) (0.004) (0.066)
Number of dependents 0.011*** 0.011*** 213.700*** 0.009*** 0.117***
(0.003) (0.003) (60.400) (0.002) (0.036)
Has a pension plan ‐0.002 ‐0.003 ‐9.862 ‐0.002 0.005
(0.005) (0.006) (102.000) (0.004) (0.060)
Full‐time student ‐0.006 ‐0.007 ‐123.400 ‐0.005 ‐0.067
(0.009) (0.010) (215.000) (0.008) (0.130)
Unemployed 0.004 0.002 147.000 0.002 0.030
(0.009) (0.010) (158.000) (0.006) (0.097)
Adjusted gross income (in thousands) ‐0.0002* ‐0.0002* ‐4.130* ‐0.0002** ‐0.003**
(0.0001) (0.0001) (2.200) (0.0001) (0.001)
Pre‐treatment savings (omitted category is >$40,000)
   No savings ‐0.013 ‐0.022** ‐360.900** ‐0.011 ‐0.244**
(0.009) (0.010) (179.000) (0.007) (0.110)
   $1 ‐ $1,000 0.002 0.001 ‐104.100 ‐0.003 ‐0.133
(0.011) (0.012) (213.000) (0.008) (0.130)
   $1,001 ‐ $2,000 ‐0.004 ‐0.007 ‐157.800 ‐0.004 ‐0.146
(0.012) (0.012) (259.000) (0.009) (0.150)
   $2,001‐$5,000 ‐0.006 ‐0.006 ‐229.800 ‐0.006 ‐0.177
(0.009) (0.011) (216.000) (0.008) (0.130)
   $5,001‐$10,000 ‐0.015 ‐0.019* ‐485.700* ‐0.016* ‐0.307**
(0.008) (0.009) (260.000) (0.009) (0.150)
   $10,001‐$20,000 ‐0.018** ‐0.021** ‐583.300** ‐0.018** ‐0.364***
(0.007) (0.007) (234.000) (0.008) (0.140)
   $20,001‐$40,000 ‐0.005 ‐0.008 ‐241.400 ‐0.006 ‐0.150
(0.010) (0.011) (228.000) (0.008) (0.130)
   Decline to answer ‐0.011 ‐0.015* ‐367.800** ‐0.011* ‐0.238**
(0.007) (0.008) (184.000) (0.007) (0.110)
Homeowner 0.003 0.004 90.080 0.002 0.043
(0.007) (0.007) (127.000) (0.005) (0.075)
Dividend income amount (in thousands) ‐0.001 ‐0.0001 72.900 0.0003 0.006
(0.004) (0.005) (63.000) (0.003) (0.043)
Refund amount (in thousands) 0.004*** 0.006*** 74.500*** 0.003*** 0.033**
(0.001) (0.001) (24.000) (0.001) (0.015)
Purchased either a RAL, IRAL, or IMAL 0.002 ‐0.00001 10.910 0.001 0.018
(0.006) (0.006) (107.000) (0.004) (0.063)
Offered Savings Bond (in treatment group ) 0.055*** 0.057*** 1231.000*** 0.045*** 0.669***
(0.005) (0.005) (170.000) (0.006) (0.097)
Constant ‐3895.000*** ‐0.141*** ‐2.034***
(558.000) (0.020) (0.320)
Observations 4,889 4,908 4,889 4,884 4,871


















Plans to save part of the refund 0.0542*** 0.0540*** 0.0209*** 0.0210*** 1.5339*** 1.1486*** 1.676***
(0.0068) (0.0067) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.2498) (0.3785) (0.5417)
Has neither a checking nor a savings account ‐0.0113 ‐0.0112 ‐0.0017 ‐0.0018 ‐0.3980 0.0994 ‐0.5012
(0.0094) (0.0093) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.2784) (0.4323) (0.6527)
Tax Filing Status (omitted category is single)
   Married filing joint 0.0054 0.0048 ‐0.0052 ‐0.0047 0.0280 0.1506 ‐0.8075
(0.0127) (0.0125) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.3055) (0.5331) (0.5593)
   Married filing separately 0.0024 0.0005 0.0049 0.0051 ‐0.3970 0.5765 ‐43.0378
(0.0350) (0.0338) (0.0244) (0.0246) (1.0405) (1.0664) +
   Head of household 0.0064 0.0057 ‐0.0026 ‐0.0024 0.1041 ‐0.1155 ‐0.1638
(0.0108) (0.0107) (0.0063) (0.0064) (0.2640) (0.4163) (0.4845)
   Qualifying widow(er) 0.2010 0.1970 0.1930 0.2000
(0.2380) (0.2370) (0.2390) (0.2430)
Age 0.0009 0.0010 0.00308** 0.00317** ‐0.0279 0.1836** 0.1067
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0429) (0.0824) (0.0967)
Age squared 0.0000 0.0000 ‐0.0000334** ‐0.0000340** 0.0005 ‐0.0019* ‐0.0012
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0005) (0.0010) (0.0012)
Gender (if not joint filer; omitted category is male)
Female  0.0010 0.0015 0.0068 0.0069 ‐0.1488 0.6364* ‐0.0515
(0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.2224) (0.3800) (0.3787)
Number of dependents 0.0134*** 0.0132*** 0.0011 0.0010 0.4235*** ‐0.0939 0.3742
(0.0047) (0.0047) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.1091) (0.1926) (0.2320)
Has a pension plan 0.0053 0.0057 ‐0.00854* ‐0.0084 0.1066 0.1586 ‐1.1141***
(0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.2021) (0.3127) (0.3758)
Full‐time student ‐0.0090 ‐0.0087 ‐0.0006 ‐0.0005 ‐0.2969 ‐0.4071 0.1644
(0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0098) (0.0098) (0.4481) (0.7629) (0.6692)
Unemployed  0.0203 0.0210 0.0074 0.0075 0.1861 0.7396* ‐1.0412
(0.0155) (0.0155) (0.0099) (0.0099) (0.3111) (0.4149) (1.0285)
Adjusted gross income (in thousands)  ‐0.000418** ‐0.000408** ‐0.000199* ‐0.000196 ‐0.00635 ‐0.0194** 0.000773
(0.000185) (0.000184) (0.000120) (0.000120) (0.00466) (0.0083) (0.007550)
Pre‐treatment savings (omitted category is >$40,000)
   No savings 0.0055 0.0055 ‐0.0060 ‐0.0068 ‐0.1385 0.6801 ‐1.6104**
(0.0152) (0.0151) (0.0087) (0.0086) (0.3756) (0.6218) (0.6407)
   $1 ‐ $1,000 0.0206 0.0222 0.0030 0.0023 0.2484 0.8849 ‐0.7163
(0.0222) (0.0224) (0.0115) (0.0113) (0.4181) (0.6696) (0.7346)
   $1,001 ‐ $2,000 ‐0.0152 ‐0.0141 0.0044 0.0042 ‐0.4232 ‐0.0374 0.1670
(0.0167) (0.0170) (0.0141) (0.0140) (0.5745) (0.9087) (0.7104)
   $2,001‐$5,000 ‐0.0046 ‐0.0043 0.0041 0.0035 ‐0.3625 0.4495 ‐0.2158
(0.0164) (0.0163) (0.0115) (0.0113) (0.4634) (0.6943) (0.6261)
   $5,001‐$10,000 ‐0.0040 ‐0.0030 ‐0.0177*** ‐0.0178*** ‐0.0184 ‐0.8915 ‐45.4297
(0.0182) (0.0183) (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.4710) (1.1260) +
   $10,001‐$20,000 ‐0.0239** ‐0.0234** ‐0.0164*** ‐0.0166*** ‐0.6211 ‐1.3177 ‐1.4541*
(0.0114) (0.0115) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.4772) (1.1187) (0.8207)
   $20,001‐$40,000 0.0047 0.0052 ‐0.0125** ‐0.0127** 0.1446 ‐0.2360 ‐1.5649
(0.0191) (0.0192) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.4353) (0.8559) (1.0715)
   Decline to answer ‐0.0113 ‐0.0108 ‐0.0010 ‐0.0011 ‐0.5101 0.2897 ‐0.5212
(0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.3913) (0.6151) (0.5827)
Homeowner 0.0002 0.0003 ‐0.0011 ‐0.0011 0.1114 ‐0.1705 0.1755
(0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.2478) (0.3919) (0.4277)
Dividend income amount (in thousands) 0.000957 0.000677 0.002250 0.002250 ‐0.2172 0.217* ‐1.3629
(0.005770) (0.005770) (0.002990) (0.003010) (0.2780) (0.130) (1.6736)
Refund amount (in thousands) 0.00520*** 0.00516*** 0.00333*** 0.00332*** 0.0838* 0.2097*** 0.0816
(0.00190) (0.00189) (0.00117) (0.00118) (0.0466) (0.0663) (0.0837)
Purchased either a RAL, IRAL, or IMAL 0.0009 0.0014 ‐0.0044 ‐0.0043 0.1631 ‐0.2454 ‐0.1493
(0.0083) (0.0083) (0.0049) (0.0050) (0.2038) (0.3337) (0.4096)
Willingness to take financial risks (omitted category is "not willing")
Takes substantial risks ‐0.0230** ‐0.0227** 0.0058 0.0057 ‐0.8478* ‐0.2026 0.6083
(0.0103) (0.0103) (0.0106) (0.0106) (0.4822) (0.6370) (0.6438)
Takes above average financial risks 0.0309** 0.0316** 0.0306** 0.0314** 0.4055 1.0669*** 1.2105**
(0.0152) (0.0153) (0.0129) (0.0131) (0.2787) (0.3928) (0.5204)
Takes average financial risks 0.0102 0.0107 0.0132* 0.0136** 0.1516 0.4909 0.9585**
(0.0092) (0.0092) (0.0068) (0.0069) (0.2199) (0.3341) (0.4473)
Decline to anwer risk question 0.0067 0.0080 ‐0.0041 ‐0.0042 0.5469** ‐1.1472 0.8967
(0.0124) (0.0126) (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.2673) (0.7554) (0.6005)
Family‐centered savings goals 0.0313** 0.0302** 0.0029 0.0026 0.4426* 0.8311** ‐1.0446*
(0.0148) (0.0146) (0.0074) (0.0073) (0.2581) (0.3962) (0.6343)
Heard of Savings Bonds before ‐0.0239* ‐0.0037 ‐0.4703* ‐0.4013 0.1430
(0.0138) (0.0080) (0.2498) (0.4053) (0.6259)
Bought  Savings Bonds before ‐0.0056 0.0028
(0.0077) (0.0051)
Constant ‐3.9631*** ‐9.6049*** ‐7.2683***
(0.9732) (1.8316) (2.1097)
Observations 3469 3464 3469 3464 3464 3464 3464


























































No response 2 0.04%37 

















































No response 279 5.35%38 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A, continued:  Survey Questions & Results for Study Participants
Question Number Percent
12. What is your (and your spouse's) most important reason for saving and investing? % responded
Education 251 9.16%
Retirement 1274 46.50%
Housing (e.g., home, home improvement, rent) 290 10.58%
Car 65 2.37%
To get ahead 150 5.47%
Emergencies 190 6.93%
Children/family 286 10.44%
Everyday household expenses 58 2.12%
To enjoy life 115 4.20%
Appliances or electronics (i.e., wash/dryer, tv) 0 0.00%
Decline to answer 61 2.23%
No response 2474 ‐‐‐
13. How much do you think you (and your family) need to have in savings for emergencies 
and other unexpected things that may come up?
$5,697 
(mean)
$8,118 (s.d.)
14. Some investments offer higher returns but are more risky.  Risk means you could lose 
some of the money you invested.  Which of the statements below comes closest to 
describing the amount of financial risk that you (and your spouse) are willing to take 
when you save or make investments?
Take substantial risks expecting to earn substantial returns 498 9.55%
Take above average risks expecting to earn above average returns 689 13.21%
Take average risks expecting to earn average returns 1690 32.41%
Not willing to risk 1670 32.03%
Decline to answer 656 12.58%
No response 11 0.21%
15. [Asked in treatment sites to bond decliners.]  Why did you not purchase a bond 
today?  (Please select only the most important reason.) % responded
The purchasing process is too confusing, too complex, and takes 
too much of my time 102 2.91%
Interest rate is too low 127 3.63%
Required holding period of one year 101 2.89%
Afraid of losing bond 82 2.34%
Don't trust US government 81 2.31%
Afraid of bond theft 62 1.77%
I don't totally understand what a US Savings Bond is, how it works, 
or why it would benefit me 104 2.97%
Choose not to save at this time 2117 60.49%
Decline to answer 724 20.69%
No response 1714 ‐‐‐